On Fighting Religious Militancy

Just when people were getting used to the lull ushered in by the February 18 elections, the suicide bomber is back with a bang. I am hardly breaking any news when I mention that suicide bombers have struck thrice since June 2 bombing of the Danish Embassy. The TV channels were quick to link the bombing outside the Danish embassy with the Danish cartoons/sketches controversy. The link between the controversial sketches and the bombing seems weak. The sketches were printed in January and it puzzles me that the religious militants would take five months to react to it. Again, the blast on Lal Masjid’s anniversary was supposedly an act to avenge the deaths of those killed in the military operation. The return of the suicide bombers appears perplexing given that both the Federal and the provincial (NWFP) governments have given clear preference to political negotiations than military action.

Also, the mood in the country regarding fighting religious militancy continues to be against any military action since it is seen only in the context of America’s war on terror. If this is the current context then don’t these attacks seem unwarranted? This article aims to establish that the religious militancy in Pakistan is not just about an angry reaction to American policy in the region. Instead, it represents a deeper problem in the Pakistani society that needs to be tackled both through the use of force and political means.

The common debate in the country (most TV channels and newspapers are flushed with it) arrived at the conclusion some time back that terrorism and religious militancy in the country is a reaction to the American policy in the region in the wake of first the events of 9/11 and later the Iraq War. The problem with this conclusion is that it simplifies the problem represented by the religious militants and reduces it to a natural human reaction devoid of any historical context. Religious militancy in Pakistan stems out of not just Pakistani government's or American policies but primarily out of the contradictions that religious militants represents within Pakistani state. The experiment that the Pakistani army conducted in the form of creating shadow armies during the first Afghan war gave way to contradictions that were ripened by the events of 9/11. The events of 9/11 brought Pakistani government in direct confrontation with these contradictions. It is also important to understand the ideological nature of religious militancy. And I am not just talking about their belief in imposing their understanding of religion onto others. The religious militant of today is perhaps a rejectionist in the true sense of the word. The religious militant rejects all notions of modern state and interacting in it through any of its political or non-political institutions. In that regard, the group becomes even more “dangerous” than the secessionist or ultra-nationalist elements within the society. The secessionist would ultimately restrict itself to the regions that the group wants unto itself. Similarly, the ultra-sub-nationalist may eventually accept a loose federation if it guarantees greater political autonomy. The religious militant of today is different in the sense that he not only wants to transform the entire society within the country but his aims and objectives reach beyond borders to tame international forces. Here, I think we may be reminded that a secessionist or an ultra-nationalist may ultimately become militant once it is convinced that it has exhausted all political avenues of reconciliation within the state. Our home grown religious militant is particularly different in this aspect. His rejection is not based on an(y) exhaustion of available avenues but instead it is based entirely on his world view that explains the existing system as a degenerate model of a 7^th century ideal. True, many would argue that this type of thinking is not exclusive to our religious militant in the tribal areas. There are many other religious forces that think much the same way. I do not disagree at all. However, the religious fanatics in the tribal areas led by Baitullah Mehsud are dangerous because they can threaten the government using what is considered primarily the right of the modern nation state i.e. the monopoly over the use of force. It is this ability i.e. the capacity to challenge the writ of the government not just politically but also militarily that makes them a contradiction within the Pakistani state. It is important to realize that this contradiction has not surfaced or developed because of the events of 9/11 and the subsequent American policy in the region. Instead, this contradiction nurtured itself within the state for long before that. The events of 9/11 only made the Pakistani state confront them. In other words, this confrontation was inevitable. Also, the current thinking that now these elements, which were once groomed by Pakistani army to first defeat the Soviets and later to control Afghanistan for strategic depth, have now become independent is incorrect. These elements have acted independently before as well. The sectarian violence in Pakistan's urban areas during mid-nineties was essentially a consequence of these religious fanatics settling their inter- and intra-sectarian conflicts through violent means. They could do so because of their ability to secure weapons.

It is therefore ahistorical to argue that current violence in the country is only a result of American policy in the region. Instead, I think the American policy only brought this conflict ahead in time for us. Here, I do not support the American policy in the region (or for that matter elsewhere) but my opposition to it stems not from the conflict that the Pakistani state is involved with militants. I am only trying to argue that this conflict was bound to happen sooner or later because of the militants' complete rejection of modern political systems and their willingness to settle disagreements through violent means. Pakistan was not fighting the war on terror in Swat, yet the rejectionist mullah Fazl-ullah turned militant to implement his view of the Shariah. In an interesting article published in International Herald Tribune and New York Times, Noah Feldman, a leading authority on Islamic history and jurisprudence at Harvard, points out how historically a demand for Shariah by Muslims particularly meant strict rule of law. In Pakistan, however, this is not the case. Implementing Sharia means cutting hands of the thief, beheading fornicators and/or adulterers and bombing girls’ schools. Again, my effort here is not to argue in favour of or against Shariah, I am only attempting to highlight the extent of rejectionism of our present day religious militant.

The question therefore arises: how must we deal with this contradiction within the Pakistani state? Where I do not disagree that we need to re-analyze our support to the American war on terror, it is important that this (re)analysis must not happen by ignoring the contradictions that the military has nurtured in the past. The use of force must remain there to disarm the militants. The writ of the state must be extended to the tribal regions not just militarily but also politically and economically. The political means must not be limited to negotiating peace deals by agreeing to implement Sharia. The political solution must involve letting political parties work in the tribal areas. The state must also do away with the colonial system of political agent and replace it with elected local officials. The vast majority of tribal population remains un-represented at the local, provincial and federal level. This need to change and one of the most significant ways it can happen is by allowing political parties to freely work in the area. This, in the long run, has the potential of isolating the religious fanatic within the society. It should be noted that this political isolation is extremely important for religious fanaticism and militancy to become irrelevant in Pakistan.