Playing Checkers....

I wrote this in response to Ejaz Haider's article (Playing Solitaire) that appeared in Daily Times on November 06, 2007 (http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2007\11\06\story_6-11-2007_pg3_5). This was never published by them.. may be I was too critical or I just dared to step on his turf... A cardinal sin i guess...

Mr. Haider's argument (Playing Solitaire, November 06, 2007) can perhaps be summed up as this: Since military enjoys so much political power and has complete monopoly over coercion, it is only pragmatic to allow it to dictate the terms of transition. Although, “transitionists” do not justify the dominance of military in politics, they argue that confronting it with the aim of bringing a transformation is not going to work because the military will simply “sweep the (chess) board or kick it over and start playing solitaire.” Mr. Haider therefore argues that “transitionists” have been vindicated because that is exactly what military has chosen to do by imposing emergency and issuing a provisional constitutional order (PCO).

Mr. Haider's argument is flawed in many ways. It is interesting to observe how Mr. Haider and Daily Time's editorial policy stresses the transition from military to civilian rule ('deals' or 'no deals') without historically looking at why the military is involved in the country's political affairs in the first place. Historically, military has seen itself as the prime guardian of country's foreign policy. Since, it pursues a certain type of foreign policy, it has influenced the internal policies as well and hence justified it's continued intervention in the political affairs of the country. Mr. Haider believes that a smooth transition is perhaps the only way to move to the ultimate transformation to complete civilian rule. This argument implicitly assumes that when the military is willing to see a smooth transition towards complete civilian rule, it is also willing to go back to conventional levels of obedience expected from the military. A transition (or a transformation for that matter), to the Pakistani military, can only mean handing over the reins of governance to a civilian set-up—but crucially, sans areas like foreign and domestic policy. This thinking reduces the civilian set-up merely a tax-collecting agency, allocating its revenues to the whims and wishes of its military commanders. The expectation of a smooth transition to a civilian rule is therefore flawed because there is no good reasons to think the military is willing to give up control over the two main areas of state politics in both short and the long run.

The argument that the higher judiciary in its activism had upped the pressure on Musharraf (and on the Army) a bit too much (see DT editorial 'Wages of Confrontation' November 05, 2007) is also flawed. The fight for the independence of the judiciary should be interpreted on the lines of an institution of state claiming its stake in power structure of the state. This in our history is something new. Historically, state-power has been fought for by the civil-military bureaucracy and the politicians. Judiciary during this power-play has mostly acted as a bystander and when need arose supported and sanctioned military interventions. This, however, changed come July 20, 2007 when judiciary retorted with a strong 10-3 judgement that put Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudry back at the helms of judicial affairs of the country. Also, what has been most disturbing to the military is the 'missing persons' case in which the state security and bureaucratic apparatus has been forced to cough up people that have been kept in illegal detention. Here, again, is another attempt by the judiciary (as a state institution) to (re)claim its stake in state's power structure by making the state's security apparatus accountable for its actions. There is no denying the fact these and other such measures had become extremely popular in a public that has suffered long at the hands of various state (security) agencies. It is important to realize that any attempt to challenge an institution or organization that also has military power has to have popular support with it. The only way to counter coercion of the state is through transformational politics that enjoy popular support. Moeed Yousaf's (as quoted by Mr. Haider in his article) raises a rather pertinent question when he questions whether Pakistan’s civilian enclave has the ability to challenge the military at this point.

For “transitionsists” since the answer to this question is a simple 'No'. It is therefore pragmatic to move towards a “space-sharing” period with the military until a transformation of civil-military relationship may take place. Again, this is a flawed argument because this assumes that during this period of space sharing, military will happily allow institutions that will eventually be able to challenge the military and make it withdraw from politics completely. The inability of Pakistani civilian enclave to challenge military stems primarily from the fact that military with its client regimes have historically destroyed and crushed all institutions that attempt to challenge its power. Today, we have no independent student-unions, those that exists are controlled by political parties that have aligned themselves with the interests of military at a drop of a hat (for example Islami Jamiat-e-Talba of Jamat-e-Islami and All Pakistan Mohajir Student Organization of MQM). Trade unions have either been destroyed or marginalized by instituting laws that restrict formation of unions (for example contract labour does not have the right to organize). Similarly, political parties due to military's monopoly over coercion are also controlled and managed to produce the type of leadership that tows the line of military dictates. It is important to understand that present state-structure exists due to a confluence of interests of political, business and military elite. Every time military has taken over, it has given itself a façade of legitimacy by enjoying support from a coterie of corrupt and 'dependable' politicians who are rewarded for their services and the class of elite businessmen that support the ensuing 'political stability' in exchange of lucrative business and privatization deals. This elite class of politicians and businessmen work in tandem with military high command's desire to depoliticize the society and make it difficult for people to organize. Any attempt by an organization that tries to challenge either the regime or military as an institution is oppressed. We don't have to go too far back in history to see an example. Only in this regime, military met peasant resistance in Okara with brute force and later handled the Pakistan Telecommunication Limited's (PTCL) union protesting its privatization in a way that would make ways of an Italian Mafia gang look benign.

In face of such brutal oppression and people already depoliticized and apathetic, it is hardly surprising that transformation seems difficult. However, that notwithstanding, to say that transformation should not be attempted as it would lead to confrontation with military doesn't make sense. Particularly, when military only wants to move towards a transition without willing to give up its role in the affairs of the state either in the short or the long run. The transition debate is not new. I am sure that in 1958 there were plenty of people suggesting such transitional politics that would lead to transformation in the long run. It has been fifty years since we had our first military coup in 1958. If five decades do not constitute long-run then what does?

Tail piece: On Monday November 05, 2007 police brutally crushed lawyers protests everywhere in the country. A day before, it arrested various leaders of the lawyers' movement, human rights activists and civil society representatives. In the wake of the emergency imposed in the name of fighting terror, the state arrested some of the most politically secular and peaceful elements in the country. On the same day it negotiated the freedom of 213 hostages with the militants in Waziristan in exchange of 25 militants captured earlier. The message by the state is clear and simple. If you are secular, unarmed and peaceful, we will break your heads open and put you behind bars. Instead, if you are long bearded militants armed to teeth who can beat us at our game, we will negotiate and let you be. Lawyers, get weapons!