The basis of historical evidence

Part II of the three part series against privatisation policy in Pakistan. The first part can be accessed here. Part II appeared in The News on Sunday on December 01, 2014 (http://tns.thenews.com.pk/the-basis-of-historical-evidence/)

The Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz government has listed some 31 state-owned enterprises (SOEs) for privatisation in the near future. There is no information available at the moment about the modalities of the process but, most likely, it will be along the lines of the procedure followed at the time of privatising Pakistan Telecommunication Company Limited (PTCL) when the government technically only ‘partially’ privatised the SOE but gave up its control over the management of the company. This is how it works.

Government offers 26 per cent shares with management control in these companies to private investors and retains a maximum of 74 per cent shares with it. The management control is given by writing down in the contract that each 1 per cent of the privately owned share carries 4 votes (as opposed to 1 vote for each percentage point of the remaining 74 per cent) in the board of directors (BoD) of the privatised company. This way, the minority shareholder private company (or consortium) commands 104 votes in the BoD and hence also manages the daily and other affairs of the company.

The change of ownership

Part I of the three part series against the privatisation policy in Pakistan. This appeared on The News on Sunday, November 24, 2013. (http://tns.thenews.com.pk/the-change-of-ownership/)

The state’s role in the economy has been a subject of much controversy in the past three decades. With the advent of neo-liberalism, both as an economic as well as a political project, the voices pointing out the ‘failures’ of the state has only gained strength. During the golden age of capitalism (roughly a time period from late 1940s to early 1970s), the state’s intervention in the economy was considered as an important, if not an essential, ingredient of fostering economic growth and prosperity.

Mainstream economic doctrine always accepted the state’s role in the economy on the basis of market’s failure to provide public goods. Private producers of public goods fail to provide them efficiently (and perhaps inadequately) as markets fail to price such goods properly. The state or the government can then step in to correct such inefficiencies. But the post-World War II time period saw all major countries of the ‘free’ world adopting Keynesian policies that particularly stressed on the government’s role in not just providing public goods but also in ensuring economic growth through demand side management of the economy.

Give a clarion call

My article that appeared in The News on October 26, 2013 (http://bit.ly/1g1WRt2)


Imran Khan’s position on the ‘war on terror’ has been roundly criticised after a spate of bomb blasts in Peshawar in the wake of the All Parties Conference. Somehow our current policy impasse viz WoT is entirely blamed on his stance, specifically on the issue of talks with the Taliban. This outrage being singularly targeted at his position on this issue is hardly understandable. He fought the election on this stance and the people of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa voted him in partly because of this position.

It is quite natural to expect that he would stick to the position that he has consistently held for the past several years now, recent attacks in Peshawar notwithstanding. No incident in the past, no matter how horrific, has made him review his position on the ‘war on terror.’ To expect Khan Sahib to change his stance on WoT and start beating the war or the operation drum now is a bit naïve. Our inability to come up with a way to tackle terrorism should not be laid at Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf’s door. One must look for the reasons elsewhere.

The Lack of Logic for Privatization: A response to Farooq Tirmizi

(The Express Tribune carried this article on October 15, 2013).

Farooq Tirmizi noted on these pages (October 11, 2013) that the case for privatization in Pakistan is quite straight forward i.e. it works. Mr Tirmizi does admit that his stance on privatization is ideological but then also states that his opponents cannot “deny the sheer mathematics of it”, which shows that “privatization works”. This line of argument is weak both theoretically and historically.

Consider.

پہرہ

اپنے غم کو لپیٹ کر 

میں 

سرہانے کہ نیچے رکھ لیتا ہوں روز 

اس ڈر سے کہ کہیں 

کوئی 

نقب زن
اسکو مجھ سے چرا نہ لیجاے  

اس ڈر سے رات بھر 

پہرا دیتا ہوں میں

خزاں

میں ایک دفعہ پھر 

ان خزاں رسیدہ پتوں 

پر 

تمھارے قدموں کے نشان ڈھونڈتا ہوں 

اس خیال کے ساتھ کہ 

یہ مجھے اس منزل پہ لے جائیں 

جہاں 

تمھارے ہونے کا احساس 

پتھروں میں ثبت ہو 

لیکن 

میں کیا کروں اس ہوا کا 

جو ہر بار ان پتوں کو اڑا لے جاتی ہے 

آزادی

ڈرتا ہوں 

کہ 

ذات کہ اس قفس میں 

اگر 

صیا د قفل کھلا چھوڑ گیا 

تو

 میں کہیں خوشی سے 

اپنے ہی پر نہ نوچ ڈالوں 

میں اب صرف ڈرتا ہوں

وجود

وہ ساری مسکراہٹیں 

سمیٹ لوں اپنی ذات میں 

جو 

مجھ پر وا ہوئیں 

وحی کی طرح 

اور 

لوٹا دوں وہ 

ساری وحشتیں جنسے 

مضطرب ہے مرا وجود 

The State and economic development

The following article appeared in The News on January 30, 2013. (http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-9-157286-The-state-and-economic-development) 

The role of the Pakistani state in the country’s economy has recently come under scrutiny - in reference to the ongoing electricity and natural gas/CNG crisis. The argument usually put forward is that these crises occur because of the state’s involvement in the economy. What needs to be done is to pull the state out from this mess and let the markets regulate the economy. The underlying logic is that market determined prices are the best signals for efficient allocation of resources. This understanding is flawed and based on an uninformed view of history of economic development in various parts of the world.

Should the Supreme Court fix prices?

(I wrote this a day after the SC's order. Couldn't get it published. Apparently, one needs strong patrons to get a benign Op-ed piece published in this country. Anyways, here it is.)

The Supreme Court of Pakistan struck again recently – this time to knock Rs30 from the price of CNG. As expected this decision was widely hailed, particularly in the Punjab where most of the CNG consumers are concentrated.  I must admit I was also excited about the decision for exactly five minutes. However, this fizzled into thin air when I finally read the short order that the court issued for this decision. The SC’s decision is highly problematic and clearly steps into the jurisdiction of the executive.

The Supreme Court has objected to three aspects of CNG pricing in its decision. First, the court expressed its reservation on government collecting the gas development surcharge (GDS)/Cross subsidisation. It points to an apparent absence of a rationale for charging this amount.

An Historical View of the Electricity Crisis in Pakistan

Much has been written about the omnipresent power crisis in Pakistan. Analysts have blamed it on various factors including lack of reforms, excessive subsidies, lack of planning and investment, etc. Whereas all these factors may be important contributors to the current crisis, they remain superficial to the extent that they fail to explain the nature of crisis in its entirety. The nature of the crisis is structural, which implies that addressing these epiphenomenal concerns may provide temporary relief but the crisis will return (with a vengeance) in the long run. This article looks at the issue in its entirety by exploring the power sector’s history and political economy. The crux of my argument is that the crisis is here to stay despite measures that may provide temporary relief and that nothing short of major policy changes will help us address this crisis.

میں مرنے کیلئے تیار ہوں

میں مرنے کیلئے تیار ہوں

بابوسر  پاس میں روکے جانے والی بس پر اگر میرا بھائی بیٹھا ہوتا تو شاید ۔شاید نہیں بلکہ یقیناً طالبان کی گولیوں کا نشانہ بنتا۔ میں یا میرے خاندان کا کوئی فردشیعہ نہیں لیکن میری والدہ کی خواہش پر ہم تمام بھائیوں کے ناموں کا دوسرا حصہ علی ہے۔ میرے بڑے بھائی کا پورا نام حیدر علی ہے۔یہ سوچ کر کہ وہ بھی شناختی کارڈ میں درج نام کی وجہ سے بس سے اتارا جاتا اور طالبانکی گولیوں کا نشانہ بنتا میرے رونگٹے کھڑے ہو جاتے ہیں۔ میں خوش ہوں کہ میرا  بڑا بھائی مملکتِ خدادادِ پاکستان کو کچھ سال پہلے ہی چھوڑ کر چلا گیا ہے۔ وہ اب جہاں ہے وہاں کم از کم اسے کوئی شناختی کارڈ پڑھ کر شیعہ ہونے کہ شبے میں گولیوں سے بھونے گا نہیں۔

Noon Meem Rashid ki Nazam "Keemia Gar"

How to win freedom and be independent

The following article appeared in Daily Times on February, 21, 2012. (http://bit.ly/xe2utd) 

We need to tax our rich and middle classes effectively and stop giving them extravagant concessions. We also need a military that is singularly focused on its professional duties — protecting our geographical borders.

Everybody in Pakistan wants an ‘independent’ foreign policy but nobody really knows what that entails. Usually an independent foreign policy is qualified by a singular objective: say no to American influence in Pakistan. Under this banner, any and everything done by the Americans — from drone strikes to defence aid to aid dollars — must be rejected. Therefore, the only obstacle to an independent foreign policy is our obsequious government — or so goes the popular narrative. As with most stories in life, this isn't so simple either. The complexity arises because of two issues: first, the business of defence aid is a serious one. Second, the (naïve) notion that independence in foreign policy can be achieved by cutting ties with the Americans. Let us address the second issue first.

Politics of Change

The following article appeared in Daily Times op-ed pages, December 12, 2011 (http://bit.ly/uL7a6o)

Any attempt to transform Pakistan or bring a ‘change’ in this country must begin with the struggle against the military’s dominance in Pakistan’s political economy. Khan sahib’s PTI does not offer any programme against these challenges

If nothing else, Imran Khan has taken the media circus by storm! Since his famous jalsa (rally) in Lahore’s Minto Park, everybody seems to be taken with his politics of ‘change’. There is no doubt that after a long time in this country the youth is politically charged. They may not be able to articulate their support for Khan sahib’s politics very well but they do seem to see him as a leader who can meet their aspirations. Before I go further on whether Khan sahib can be an agent of much needed change in Pakistan, two points need further analysis. First, Imran Khan’s exclusive focus on the youth to form his support base, and second, why does the youth in this country support him.

Moving beyond Jinnah’s Pakistan

The article appeared in Daily Times on August 30, 2011 http://bit.ly/nTMemN

What exists right now in the name of the Pakistani state is an institution that oppresses its citizens, discriminates against them on the basis of religion, usurps their rights, and rewards the coterie of a few, which consists of the civil-military bureaucracy and politicians

Pakistan just celebrated its 64th Independence Day. As usual the day was marked with promises to make Pakistan the greatest nation (and country) the world has ever witnessed. It is ironic that nobody paused for a second to reflect that the country is, at present, struggling to be even a mediocre one. I guess birthdays are a reason for drunken optimism, however unrealistic it may be. Each year August is also the month when both the conservatives and liberals in Pakistan invoke Jinnah’s vision of Pakistan to suit their (respective) ideological aspirations.

Why the military is the problem in Pakistan

The following article appeared in Daily Times op-ed pages, July 21, 2011 (http://bit.ly/qarCkY)

The series of events that unfolded in Pakistan since the Raymond Davis incident in Lahore have probably only one upside. In recent memory, the past few months have been the only time in the country when the army’s role as an institution has been questioned by mainstream media. In some ways this is not a mean achievement. True, military leaders have been criticized in the past, retired General Pervez Musharraf being a prime example of that. The opening up of the electronic media in Pakistan did lead to a widening trend of questioning the political role performed by Pakistan’s previous military rulers. If nothing else, it helped shape the weak narrative that Pakistani people have now generally accepted that military rulers are a bad idea for the country or, if nothing else, in the long run they prove to be no better than civilians. However, the media largely refrained from questioning the military’s role as the most powerful institution in shaping the nature and structure of the Pakistani state.

Of wedges and gulfs

    The following article appeared in Daily Times op-ed pages, June 15, 2011 (http://bit.ly/jf6hBJ)


    The 139th Corps Commanders Conference (held at the GHQ on June 9, 2011), like many other such conferences in the past 6-7 years, reiterated the resolve of the armed forces, particularly the army, to fight religious militancy. It placed all the security agencies on the same footing when it comes to fighting the menace. This is hardly news. We have all grown accustomed to such proclamations yet

#Ranatrial tweets from the courtroom. June 2-8, 2011

Chicago Sun-Times Rummana Hussain tweets from the Chicago courtroom. Compiled here chronologically. Tweets from June 2-8, 2011

1. Rana's interrogation video being played at #Ranatrial. Rana's hair is dyed...
   
2. Hard to hear but Rana says he discussed talking about clearing his AWOL status with Major Iqbal #Ranatrial
   
3. Rana: #Headley had a dog named Tyson #Ranatrial
   
4. Stipulated that Rana's business never filed W2 or other tax forms for#Headley.
   
5. Prosecutors rest #Ranatrial

Remembering Bhutto

The Skype ring wouldn’t stop. I checked my watch; it was six-thirty in the morning. Who could it be? It was my brother; I quickly answered and asked if everything was all right. “No, it isn’t. They have killed her”, he replied from the other side. My immediate response was some choicest Punjabi expletives reserved only for moments of extreme anger and frustration. Somehow, he didn’t need to explain who “they” were and who “her” was in his sentence. Who else could it be?